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ABSTIWCT Many of the observed problems of water management in developing
countries are linked to inefficient institutional structures of property rights. This is
particularly the case with many public irrigation systems tliat have never achieved the
expected social and economic benefits. In this paper it is argued that the Contingent
Valuation Method (CVM) can be applied to evaluate the degree of inefficiency of such
institutional structure for the case of one of the most important irrigation systems in
Ecuador in the Peninsula of Santa Elena (PSE). The procedure applied consists of
eliciting an economic value among irrigators. Thus, Willingness to Pay (WTP) questions
are used to value a specific outcome of a policy intended to assure the right to have an
efficient management of the canals. The evaluation criterion consists of comparing the
resulting economic value with the price currently charged to irrigators. Any deviation is
considered an economic rent which is wasted. Thus, CVM is used to investigate the
potetitia! benefits of a hypothetical change in the existing property rights structure. The
estimation results assert that the proposed change would provide positive net benefits to
water users in the PSE.
Introduction
A critical point between the field of economics and law is how property rights
affect the ultimate use of a particular resource. For n:iany years literature has
claimed that under certain well-defined conditions, the assignment of property
rights will not affect the ultimate allocation of goods among rational actors (see for
example Calabresi & Melamed, 1972; Landes & Posner, 1987; Posner, 1992).
However, this view has raised some observations. According to Levy & Friedman
(1994) the circumstances under which this applies "may be more limited than is
often assumed ..., mainly because the arguments are valid only under very
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restrictive conditions". These conditions are: (i) allocation and redistribution
decisions must not affect marginal values; (ii) goods must be freely substitutable;
(iii) property rights must be well defined and enforced, and {iv) goods must be
fungible. In this respect, few studies have explored the relationship between legal
rights and the economic allocation of goods that do not fulfill one or more of these
conditions (Levy & Friedman, 1994).
On the other hand, literature on Contingent Valuation Methods (CVM) gives no
clear orientations in how far property rights definition can be a determinant of the
economic value of a particular resource. While many theorists concentrate on
trying to explain the high observed variance between Willingness to Pay (WTP)
and Willingness to Accept (WTA) measures reported in many empirical studies,
few have attributed such differences to how property rights are defined or
perceived by people in the case of goods with no close substitutes (see mainly
Hanemann, 1991; examples of attempts to explain divergences between WTP and
WTA on statistical grounds can be found in Randall & Stoll, 1980; Coursey et al.,
1987; Mitchell & Carson, 1989).
The discussion point raised is therefore whether the economic value of a
particular resource is influenced by the institutional structure of property
rights involved in the allotment of such a resource. Based on economic
principles the answer is 'yes'. However, in the application arena few studies
have related their aggregated monetary valuations with the institutional
structure of property rights. This becomes particularly cumbersome when
the resource has no close substitutes or when there are neither well-defined
nor well-enforced property rights as is typically the case in countries such as
Ecuador.
In the case of irrigation for agricultural purposes, water is an input for the
production process. This means that not only the economic value of the resource is
important but also the costs of provision and the current prices, which should in
principle be equated one to the other in order to internalize the full range of
externalities derived from using water in agriculture. So, economic valuation
methods can be used to provide some clues in the difficult task of pricing
irrigation water, although as previously discussed such an approach must
necessarily consider the underlying institutional structure in order to understand
what is being valued and what determines its value.
Given that in the Peninsula of Santa Elena (PSE) irrigation is already priced
under a particular institutional structure, economic values can in this case be
calculated and used to assess the efficiency of the institutional structure of
property rights by means of comparing the estimated value against the current
price of water. The hypothesis is that a sub-optimal definition of property rights
limits the value people assign to water. People may in fact be willing to pay higher
values for having better defined property rights that assure them an optimal
provision of irrigation. If this is the case it means that institutional failures in the
ISE do not allow internalizing (through price) what users perceive irrigation
should be valued at.
This paper is divided into four further sections. The next section describes the
research problem. This is followed by a development of the theoretical framework
and is particularly related to the valuation method. There is then a development of
the economic valuation exercise using CVM and the final section concludes and
provides some ideas for further research.
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The Irrigation Problem in the Peninsula of Santa Elena, Ecuador
The PSE is a coastal area of about 6050 km-. Until the end of the 19th century it was
considered an area with high potential for developing agricultural activities.
Nevertheless, due to an abrupt deforestation that altered the hydrological cycle,
such good conditions changed. Based on information from the National Council
for Water Resources (CNRH), 95% of the original forest of this area has been
removed, making the PSE one of the driest areas of Ecuador. The government
solution was the construction of a huge Hydraulic Project called the 'Santa-Elena
Aqueduct Hydraulic-Project (PHASE)', which was developed by a governmental
agency, the Commission for the Development of the Guayas River Basin
(CEDEGE).'
The different phases of the project began in 1986 and comprise about 120 km of
canals, a tunnel of 7 km, two pumping stations to elevate water 70 m, and three
dams with a total storage capacity of 352 million m .^ The irrigation capacity of the
PHASE has been calculated to be 42 000 hectares'^ with an investment of about
US$580 million, mostly granted by international development organizations by
way of foreign debt or contributions (CEDEGE, 2001).
The main goal of the PHASE is to provide water throughout the whole year,
solving both the spatial and temporal dimension of the water scarcity problem.
The conflicts began when CEDEGE started the construction of the irrigation
system, which sparked a sudden interest in buying land under the influence of the
canals. Not only farmers but also particularly speculators took advantage of both
the misinformation on the value of those lands and the confusing legal framework
regarding the property of land by the communes. The final outcome is that after 8
years of operation of the canals less than 6000 ha are being cultivated and there are
huge problems ensuring the sustainability of the PHASE operation, and therefore
agricultural activities.
Regarding the peasants-commoners of the PSE, their main characteristic is their
communal organization whose predominant feature is the communal ownership
of land.^ They are still considered the largest population group and possessed
approximately 85% of the land before the construction of the irrigation system.
Today, it has been calculated that 90% of that land has been sold, leaving the
commoners with the unproductive land and without possibilities for develop-
ment. Therefore, even though water was considered the key limiting factor for the
development of these communes, in terms of CEDEGE's current policy it became
a resource available for those who can pay its price.
On the other hand, water policy is not well defined and in general there are no
incentives to improve the situation. CEDEGE is not recovering the cost of the
infrastructure and farmers are neither well organized nor convinced of taking part
in the operation and maintenance (O&M) activities jointly with CEDEGE. Table 1
shows some figures regarding the predicted capacity of the PHASE and the
current supply of water as well as the distribution of irrigators per irrigation zone.
Although commoners appear to make up a great percentage of the total users, the
proportion of land they hold is minimal. On average a commoner possesses 1 to 2
ha while single private farmers can hold in some cases up to 1000 ha.
Property Rights and Economic Valuation
Given that markets rarely reflect economic values for most of the environmental
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Table 1. Irrigation potential (current and predicted) and registered users per Irrigation
area
Irrigation zone Predicted In Under Registered Commoners
capacity (ha) operation (ha) construction (ha) users
Chongon - Playas 15691
Aziicar - Sube y Baja 27113
Total 42804
Source: CEDEGE.
goods, researchers turned to non-behavioural methods for valuing resources, in
particular survey methods such as CVM. However, there is considerable
controversy over whether CVM adequately measures people's WTP for non-
marketed goods. Besides the problems that can arise from questionnaire design
and sampling procedures, the main problem is the observed difference between
WTP and WTA found in many empirical studies, which in theory should be very
close. Many researchers have documented this variability and investigated its
causes (see e.g. Mitchell & Carson, 1989) but none has been completely successful
(Levy & Friedman, 1994).
However, from the previous discussion it is clear from economic principles that
economic values will vary as property rights change, so the interpretation of
values requires taking into account the underlying property rights structure
involved in the WTP-CV elicitation question. That is, if people view themselves as
the owners of a resource, valuation estimates will be much higher than if people
believe others own the resource. Thus, WTA and WTP questions imply different
perceptions of property rights with respect to the resource involved: WTA
suggests that people (respondent) own the resource, while WTP suggests they do
not. So, CVM practitioners, in trying to keep the conventional perspective that
property rights should have little effect on values, have shown relatively little
recognition of these implications. It is clear, however, that WTA-WTP divergences
may demonstrate that for less substitutable goods, including various public
goods, values vary as property rights definition changes (see for example Levy &
Friedman, 1994; Horowitz & McConnell, 2000; Arcuri, 2002).
The strategy followed in this paper is to undertake an economic valuation
exercise that intentionally implies a change (through the wording of the WTP
question) in the property rights structure of irrigation in the PSE. Thus, given that
irrigation water is priced, on average, at USS0.035 per m"*, the WTP-CV question is
expected to yield a higher aggregated value. This higher value would demon-
strate that marginal improven:\ents in the structure of property rights are valued
positively by irrigators in the PSE. This in turn implies that the underlying
institutional structure is not efficient, given that it does not allow maximizing
welfare because of the rents that are not being internalized and used to finance
such improvements.
Based on Vermillion (1999), Table 2 provides a list of the bundle of property
rights related with the provision of irrigation for the specific case of the PSE and
also a brief evaluation of five desirable characteristics property rights should have.
These are exclusivity, transferability, durability, enforceability and flexibility, ln
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each case the holder of the property right is identified and the level of each
characteristic is assessed in a three-point scale.
Application of the Contingent Valuation
The Method
CVM is a questionnaire-based valuation-technique that is used to obtain WTP or
WTA measures directly from respondents with respect to specific goods, mainly
non-marketed goods {environmental or public goods). Various question formats
have been developed and used by economists (for more details see Holvad, 1999).
Two approaches are used in this paper: (1) the single-bounded approach, which in
fact is the same as the close-ended format first introduced by Bishop & Heberlein
in 1979, where pre-tested values of WTP are used to ask people to accept or reject
('yes' or 'no') proposed values for the resource in a hypothetical market; and {2}
the double-bounded approach first proposed by Hanemann (1985) and Carson
(1985) and applied for the first time by Carson et al. (1990) and Hanemann et al.
(1991). In this approach a second question follows the first question, eliciting
specific values to which they can only respond 'yes' or 'no'. The amount presented
in the second bid depends on the response to the first bid: a lower amount if the
answer is 'no' and a higher amount if the answer is 'yes'. Thus, if somebody
answers 'yes' to one of the questions and 'no' to the other, this provides both
upper and lower bounds of WTP. Blocks of questions are normally introduced in
the questionnaire to confirm given values of WTP as well as to provide
socioeconomic information (income, gender, age, etc.) or specific characteristics
of the respondents.
The Survey
In a first stage an exploratory research among farmers was developed to
accomplish two objectives: (1) to have a better idea of the variables affecting WTP
in order to define the hj^othetical situation; and (2) to define the range of values
of WTP (the price tiers) to be elicited using the close-ended (dichotomous) format.
The resource to be valued was limited to irrigation water provided by the
PHASE. The hypothetical programme consisted of regulatory actions intended to
increase the use of the irrigation infrastructure. The scenario presented was
described in terms of users forced to pay in the near future the total costs of
maintenance and operation of the canals (as a result of the transfer of the Property
Right related to the use of the system) and progressively other components of the
costs (currently subsidized) even if the demand for water remains the same in the
future. However, respondents were told that such a payment could be equal or
even lower if everybody demands water and the number of users is increased.
Two questions were designed: (1) Would you be willing to pay $(price) per
cubic metre of irrigation water under the following conditions (the hypothetical
situation)?; and (2) Would you be willing to pay ${twice or half the price
depending on the last response) per cubic metre of irrigation water under the
following conditions (the hypothetical situation)? The only accepted answers
were 'yes' or 'no' to each bid. Although it can be thought that such question
format implies marginal valuations, irrigation in the PSE is provided and charged
on a volumetric basis, the unit of measure being cubic metre whose price is fixed
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for any demanded quantity, thus making irrelevant whether or not the valuation
is done per cubic metre or for the total demand per irrigator. In fact, whichever
unit of measure is used, the concept of total economic value implies that a total
value (use and non-use values) is being elicited, which can be expressed in terms
of marginal units of the resource. More important, however, is the fact that
respondents in the PSE are very familiar and confident of expressing their
perceptions of value in cubic metres. Even so, increasing emphasis is being put on
the importance of collecting marginal values rather than total values in CVM
surveys (for more details see for example Bulte & Van Kooten, 1999).
WTP values were stratified after the exploratory research on three levels as
follows: S0.02 ($0.01; $0.04); $0.04 ($0.02; $0.08); $0.08 ($0.04; $0.08) where the
values in parenthesis are the lower and higher bounds for each bid. The bid
amount varied among the respondents. The analysis proceeds on the assumption
that each individual has a maximum willingness-to-pay and that such WTP
values have a probability distribution in the population with a defined
distribution function.
Sixty surveys were completed by direct interview between September and
December of 2002. The pre-test stage was carried out with about 20 farmers,
mostly by telephone. In terms of the area surveyed it is about 3000 ha, which is
almost half of the area with agricultural production under the influence of the
PHASE. Just considering the active farmers, such a sample size implies a sampling
error of about 5% for a 95% confidence interval. Noting that the total population of
users consists of about 470 people, of which only 65% are active farmers (therefore
water users) this sample size implies that about 20% of the total population of
water users' were interviewed.
Contingent Valuation Results
Single-bounded approach. The economic foundation of CVM implies that two
variables must be included as explanatory variables in order to be consistent
with a Random Utihty Maximization (RUM) model:* (1) a measure of income,
which in this case is the Gross Annual Income (GAI) for each unit of
production in hundreds of thousands of dollars; and (2) the price bid proposed
to each respondent (ELI). The selection of the appropriate model was made
using three criteria which are mentioned in order of importance:
1. Improvements in the value of the likelihood function;
2. Improvements in the values of three selected information criteria: the Akaike,
the Schwarz and the Haiman-Quinn criterion (for more details see Grasa,
1989); and
3. Improvements in the percentage of correct classification of responses based on
predicted probabilities.
An extended model including several variables was first run in order to arrive at a
consistent model. Removal of variables was controlled based on the interaction of
the proposed criteria and on the requirements of the RUM specification. The
resulting model includes the following variables: (1) predominance of permanent
crops (PERMCR) in the unit of production ('1' if permanent crops are predom-
inant and '0' if otherwise); and (2) the proportion of land use (PROPUSE) as a
percentage of the total area of the farm. The first variable was frequently
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Table 3. Single bounded WTP coefficients estimation
Variables Coefficients Means of variables
Constant
Bid price (ELIl)
Predominance of permanent crops (PERMCR)
Proportion of use (PROPUSE)
Gross annual income (GAT)
13.636 (2.369) *•
-205.381 (43.04)**
-3.681 (0.377)"
7.485 (0.923)*"*
-1.367(0.225)**
-
0.042
1.60
0.55
1.09
Log likelihood: -11.863; LR Stahstic (4df): 49.577; Probability of LR: 0.000
Info criterion (minimum values) Akaike: 0.56; Schwarz: 0.736637; Hannan-Q: 0.6303
Percentage of correct classifications: 88.3%; Percent gain from default (constant probability)
specification: 61.11%
Nagelkerke R square=0.797; McFadden R-squared=0.676326
Goodness of fit: H-L StaHstic=l-0343, prob (Chi-Sq-8d0=0.9980; Andrews Statistic (grouped by
ELI)=0.0485, prob (Chi-Sq-3df): 0.9972
Notes: *Signilicance: p < 0.05; **.significance: p <0.1; •••significance p <0.I5
mentioned during the qualitative research as a key factor because of its relation
with the risk and the extent of the investments needed.
Note that the CV model does not impose any particular restriction on the
selection of other variables for the model except for the two already mentioned.
However, it was found that the logistic specification of the distribution of
probability does, although in terms of minimizing the resulting number of
variables depending on the number of observations. So, given the limitations on
the sample size, the procedure followed consisted of running several regressions
to test for the best explanatory power of the model with the lowest number of
variables. Tlie single-bounded logit analysis uses as dependent variable the
acceptance ('yes=l') or rejection ('no=0') to the first bid amount. Table 3 shows the
results of the econometric model for the single-bounded approach. A first look at
the results shows that all the signs of the coefficients give the correct expected
effect to the dependent variable except for GAI, which will be discussed later. All
the coefficients are significant at 5%.
The interpretation of the coefficients in this case is not straightforward as in
linear regression. In fact, a direct evaluation of the coefficients in the regression
equation yields the log of the odd^ between a 'yes' and a 'no' response, which is
called a logit. The logistic coefficients are interpreted as the change in the log odds
associated with one-unit change in the independent variable. Thus for a
respondent facing a price bid of US$0.02, a predominance of permanent crops
(1), a proportion of land use of about 55% and a gross annual income of
US$110 000, the probabiUty of accepting the bid is almost 100%. In this case, the
odd is 123.4 and the log odd 4.8155. These lasts results come from evaluating the
logit function: estimated prob ('yes')=l/(l + e - z), where z=bO + bl X 1 + b2 X 2
...; However, if the price bid is increased by 1 cent to 0.03 keeping other variables
constant, the new odd and log odd are respectively 15.82 and 2.76. The difference
between these log odds is exactly 100 times the value of the coefficient (205.38),
that is 2.05. This means that increasing the price bid by 1 cent, the log odd is
reduced by a factor of about 2.05. So, for example, for a price bid of US$ 0.04, its
probability of being accepted is about 66%. This result is consistent with the RUM
The Contingent Valuation Method 545
1.00
0-9Q
^ 0.80
= 0.70
D.60
D.50
I D.40
"8 0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
0.00 0 01 0.02 0,03 0.04 0.05 0.06
Price bid
0 07 0.08 0.09 Q.10
% use (20%)
• GAI (0.6)
% use (50%)
—9—Permanent
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of accepting the price bid for different scenarios of land
use and income
assumption which states that the demand function must slope downward for the
planned change over the resource. This also confirms that the responses are
consistent with a canonical model which states that improvements on welfare are
valued positively. Similar analysis can be done for the rest of variables.
The coefficient for GAI implies that when income increases for example from
US$110 000 to US$200 000, the probability of accepting the price bid decreases
from 66% to 34% changing the log odds by a factor of about 1.367. Although there
is no theoretical reason for this coefficient to be negative, an explanation can be
found in the low dependence of some farmers' economy on agriculture as a main
source of income. Figure 1 shows some interactions in terms of the probability of
accepting the bid against the price bid in dollars per cubic metre for different
scenarios of land use and income.
For the logit probability model, Hanemann (1984) provides formulas to
aggregate values of WTP based on the estimated coefficients. Those formulas
are available for the unrestricted expected value, the median, and the truncated
expected value, which restricts WTP to be positive. To proceed with this, an
augmented coefficient was first calculated for the model denoted by Pa which
results from evaluating the coefficient estimates at the means of the independent
variables except for the coefficient of the bid price which is denoted pbp- The
augmented coefficient (only considering the significant variables) is 10.39. So, the
mean (E{WTP)) for -^<WTP<^, which in turn equals the median WTP is
calculated by the ratio pa / -pbp- This ratio resulted in an aggregated value of
US$0.05 per cubic metre of irrigation water. On the other hand, the truncated
mean, (E{WTP)), for 0<WTP<=c is calculated by the following formula: ln(l + exp
(Pa))/ ~Pbp which resulted in a similar aggregated value of WTP.
Double-bounded approach. A multinomial logistic regression for different
scenarios of WTP responses was done using the same variables of the single-
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bounded approach. However, a better fit was found by including two new
variables in the model which became significant when the second bid was
proposed to the respondents. These variables are water requirement per year
(WREQ) in hundred thousand cubic metres and the total area of the farm
(TOTAREA) in hectares.
Table 4 shows the results of both models: model 1 (same variables) and model 2
(same variables plus two extra variables). Although the coefficients are slightly
different in each model, the analysis reveals the same conclusions. So, the increase
in prediction power of model 2 due to the introduction of the new variables can be
a result of the bidding game in which a second follow-up question of WTP is
proposed to the respondents (higher or lower depending on the first response).
Again, a first glance of the signs indicates that aU the coefficients give the
expected effect to the dependent variable, althovigh as can be observed they have
exactly the opposite sign from the single-bounded approach. This is so because in
this case each coefficient directly gives the log odds ratio between each category of
the dependent variable compared with the last category, in this case 'Yes' 'Yes' to
the sequence of WTP questions. That is, each coefficient gives us the log odd ratio
of having answered 'NN', 'NY', and 'YN' versus having answered 'YY' if all
independent variables are held constant.
The values for the price bid in model 2 indicate the impact of one-unit increase
on it over each log odd ratio. The positive effects in this case show that when the
initial price bid is increased in one unit, then the probability of answering each of
the following options 'NN', 'NY', 'YN' is also increased compared with a 'YY'
answer. The strongest effects are for NY (233.10) and NN responses (152.32) and
the weakest for YN (67.58). For the case of the predominance of permanent crops
the strongest effect is for NY (5.386) which means tliat having answered like this,
con\pared with a YY response, the probability is increased when the crop pattern
is changed to one with predominance of permanent crops. Roughly speaking, this
means that when such a crop pattern is changed it is more likely to have a NY
answer compared with a YY response. A similar analysis can be done for the rest
of variables. Figure 2 shows the behaviour of the multinomial responses for
different levels of price bid in dollars per cubic metre.
Using again the formulas to aggregate values of WTP based on the estimated
coefficients, the results are as follows: the augmented coefficient for model 1 is
-6.4504 and -6.7352 for model 2. Thus, the mean (E(WTP)) for -^<WTP<=c, which
in turn equals the median WTP, is calculated by Pa / ~Pbp- This ratio results in an
aggregated value of US$ 0.049 per cubic metre of irrigation water for model 1 and
US$0,045 for model 2. The truncated mean, (E(WTP)), for 0<WTP<^ resulted in
more or less the same values. These results are slightly lower compared with the
results from the single-bounded approach; however they can be considered more
reliable given the improvement of statistical efficiency by using the double-
bounded approach.
Discussion
As expected the resulting aggregated value of WTP is higher than the current
water price (US$0,035 per cubic metre in average) which means that the gain in
efficiency due to the public provision of irrigation under the conditions of the
hypothetical situation are wasted rents. This confirms the hypothesis of an
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Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of accepting the price bid for different scenarios of
responses
inefficient institutional structure of water allocation for the specific case of the
PSE.
It is important to note that such a value does not cover yet the full cost of
provision of irrigation. Remember, however, that the valuation exercise only
valued a hypothetical change in one of the rights of the whole bundle of property
rights involved in allocating water for agriculture in the PSF; in this case the one
related with the use of the infrastructure. Even so, the value found is about 40%
higher than the current price. This introduces an important consideration for
future CV studies. The results indicate that it is possible to apply CVM to value
marginal WTP for partial changes in the institutional structure of property rights
of a specific resource. So, maximizing the value of a resource by introducing the
correct incentives in an environment of well-defined property rights can be a more
useful approach for CV than just calculating an aggregated monetary value. The
challenge, therefore, is to find out what type of institutional structure (regime) of
property rights maximizes the economic value people assign to a particular
resource.
However, the question remains at what level water should be priced in the PSE.
Using some guidelines provided by Whitaker & Alzamora (1990) the following
estimations can be made. Given that Ecuadorian law stipulates that 25% of total
investment (US$580) plus all interest on capital can be given as subsidy to water
users, the real amount of capital to be recovered is about US$450 million.
Therefore the minimum CEDEGE should be collecting per year to redeem this
value is US$6 million.^ Thus, the magnitude of the subsidy due to interests (with
an annual interest rate of 1%) is about US$2.5 million which means that so far the
subsidy given to the PHASE is about US$4.5 million per year including the
subsidies on capital and interest previously mentioned.
With respect to O&M costs, Whitaker & Alzamora (1990) calculate that on
average for Ecuador, they represent about \0% of the total value of an irrigation
system/ This implies that for the specific case of the PHASE, the annual O&M cost
could be in the range of US$0.8 million to US$1 million, which for the current
demand of water (5500 ha on average) implies that less than 50% of the O&M cost
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is being recovered. This latter figure was calculated considering the current price
of US$0,035 per cubic metre and an annual water requirement of 2000 m^ per
hectare.^ Nonetheless, if the price is increased to USS0.05, about 70% of such cost
would be recovered. Even so, total subsidies still account for about 94% of the full
cost of provision of irrigation which is almost equal to the average reported by
Whitaker & Alzamora (1990) of 95.8% for Ecuador. The problem is that only a
price of about 60 cents per cubic metre, given the current water demand, would
pay such cost. However, if full use of the PHASEs' capacity is assumed with a
price of US$0.05 per cubic metre, about 60% of the total cost would be recovered as
well as 75% of the O&M cost. Therefore, a sound policy would be to strengthen the
property rights that force land owners to demand water from the PHASE at a
price of US$0.05 per cubic metre in order to internalize the externality produced
by those who are not using water.
Conclusions
• Irrigation in PSE is framed in a very weak institutional structure where
attributions are not well defined and in general incomplete contracts allow
users become involved in opportunistic behaviour like the low use of irrigated
land.
• The so far 'free' government investment has created the impression that the
irrigation system of the PSE belongs to the government and therefore it is their
responsibility to operate and maintain the canals. This assistance has certainly
discouraged farmers from placing more risk in their investments in the PSE.
• Given that pricing water has been the only water-allocation policy-tool used by
CEDEGE and prices are not calculated on a technical basis, there is a deviation
between prices and values that explain in some degree the limitations of the
current functioning of the institutional structure of property rights in the PSE to
get maximum benefits from allocating water in agriculture. The inefficiency is
revealed by the higher observed WTP of irrigators for an improved property
right that assures them an optimal provision of irrigation under the circum-
stances of the hypothetical situation formulated in the CV questionnaire.
• A favourable point is that the hypothetical programme proposed is valued at
US$0,015 per cubic metre over the current price of US$0,035, which means that
the programme is considered an improvement and could be considered an
objective for future policy-design for this specific case.
• Results of WTP of users in the PSE are very sensitive. This can be interpreted as
a poor commitment of users with the irrigation problem in the PSE. This may be
due to the fact that the current allocation of property rights impedes users from
having a more active role in the integrity of the transaction and also limits the
power of CEDEGE as a regulator to intervene in the allocation of water and
land. There is, therefore, an urgent need to deepen the analysis of institutional
choices for both water and land.
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Notes
1. Its creation in 1967 was recommended by the Department of Natural Resources of the
Organization of American States, which declared the Guayas River Basin as one of
the areas with highest potential for agricultural development in the country.
2. The PHASE in turn utilizes water stored in the Daule-Peripa reservoir for both
irrigation and drinkable water throughout the PSE. The water is pumped from the
lower Daule River near La Toma in the Guayas province. It goes up 75 m to an
aqueduct which carries it to the Chongon dam where the distribution to the PSE
starts.
3. They are considered the historic prolongation of the Mantefio-Huancavilca society
during the colonial era. A commune is a socio-political unit identified witli a
particular territory. Each commune has both deliberative and participative instances
through its main political organization: the general assembly.
4. This is a stochastic component representing the link between both the economical and
the statistical model.
5. The odd of an event occurring is defined as the ratio of the probability that it will
occur to the probability that it will not.
6. The law foresees that investments in irrigation should be recovered in 75 years.
7. This estimation is based on 35 irrigation projects already built in Ecuador. This cost
includes water management, irrigation management, central management and
institutional planning.
8. This water requirement is appropriate for mangoes, which represent about 40%of ttie
total cropped area in PSE.
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